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For millenia, people have been asking questions
such as “What is the world made of?” and “What
are its most fundamental components?”  The
Greek philosopher Democritus (c. 470-380 B.C.)
postulated an atomic theory which held that indi-
visible particles constitute all of matter, but it
wasn’t until the nineteenth century that this theo-
ry received any empirical support (even though
indivisibility remains unsupported).  This support
was given in botanist Robert Brown’s 1827
observations of apparently random motion of
pollen grains in water, as explained in Albert
Einstein’s 1905 application of James Clerk
Maxwell’s and Ludwig Boltzmann’s 1860 kinetic
theory of gases, a clear example of the interplay
of observation, theory, and experiment basic to
physics.  In the hundred years following
Einstein’s annus mirabilis,2 physicists have
learned that most matter is made of nuclei and
electrons, that nuclei are made of neutrons and
protons, that these are made of quarks, and that
quarks and electrons, though possibly indivisible,
may “simply” be special modes of oscillations of
yet more fundamental “strings.”  Brown,
Maxwell, Boltzmann, and Einstein worked in the
context of the success of modern (Newtonian)
science, which by means of abstraction and
empirical studies optimistically de-mystified
much of the world into tidy physical explanations
in mathematical language.
While scientific developments of the past few
centuries represent significant progress toward
obedience to the cultural mandate3 and the mani-
festations of Christ’s lordship and restoration of
life and the cosmos, a dark side has presented
itself as well.  This was the slow but steady
growth of reductionism, as majority elements of
both the scientific community and the general
public under its influence developed a point of
view that brain physiologist Donald MacKay
calls “nothing-buttery”: there is nothing in the
universe but particles and interactions.4 Among
the most vocal and dogmatic is Nobel prize-win-
ning theoretical physicist Steven Weinberg, who
rebuts moral philosopher Mary Midgley’s claim
that statements like “George was allowed home
from prison at last on Sunday” cannot be
explained in the language of physics by saying,
apart from historical accidents that by defini-
tion cannot be explained, the nervous sys-
tems of George and his friends have evolved
to what they are entirely because of the prin-
ciples of macroscopic physics and chemistry,
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which in turn are what they are entirely
because of the principles of the standard
model of elementary particles…. [T]he
reductionist world view...rules out other sorts
of understanding [such as that] George
behaves the way he does because he has a
soul that is governed by laws quite unrelated
to those that govern particles or thunder-
storms…. I can readily believe that at least in
principle we will one day be able to explain
all of George’s behavior reductively, includ-
ing what he says about how he feels, and that
consciousness will be one of the emergent
higher-level concepts appearing in this
explanation…. Of course, everything is ulti-
mately quantum-mechanical…. [Research]
moves us closer to the reductionist goal of
finding the laws of nature that lie at the start-
ing point of all chains of explanation.5
Weinberg’s friend and Oxford chemist, P.W.
Atkins, is even more triumphalistic in his views:
Scientists, with their implicit trust in reduc-
tionism, are privileged to be at the summit of
knowledge, and to see further into truth than
any of their contemporaries....While poetry
titillates and theology obfuscates, science
liberates....The principal activity of the brain,
that of sustaining a sense of consciousness
through a lifetime, is open to explanation
rooted in its physical structure (as governed
by the body’s genes being inherited and find-
ing expression through the purposeless
workings of the second Law [of thermody-
namics], essentially building on the purpose-
less collapse of sandwiches into chaos) and
its chemical activity.6
It becomes clear in Atkins’ writing that “open to
explanation” is meant in the ultimate sense that
he considers it simple fact that human thought is,
at least in principle, reducible to physics.  Atkins
actually believes that science is able to achieve an
“accounting for the emergence of everything
from absolutely nothing.” 7
As seen above, both Weinberg and Atkins
believe that mind emerges from matter.
Emergence has, in fact, developed into a key con-
cept in the philosophy of mind.  In the past cou-
ple of decades, however, problems with reduc-
tionism have led many philosophers of science to
adopt an approach called “nonreductive physical-
ism,” while retaining a revised notion of emer-
gence.  In the past decade, this approach has
begun to impact the burgeoning field of “science
and religion,” as a number of influential Christian
philosophers and theologians consider it to be in
significant concordance with biblical anthropolo-
gy.  
Non-Reductive Physicalism Defined
The clearest definition of nonreductive physi-
calism articulated in a Christian context is given
in a collection of papers8 whose authors, accord-
ing to co-editor Nancey Murphy, agree “with the
scientists and philosophers who hold that it is not
necessary to postulate a second metaphysical
entity, the soul or mind, to account for human
capacities and distinctiveness [while indicating
their] rejection of contemporary philosophical
views that say that the person is ‘nothing but’ a
body.”9 After a brief discussion of hierarchies
(more on this later), such as physics-chemistry-
biology-psychology-sociology, she more precise-
ly defines “nonreductive physicalism” in terms of
three other positions.10 Ontological reduction-
ism, which these authors accept, is the position
that “no new kinds of metaphysical ‘ingredients’
need to be added to produce higher-level entities
from lower,” thus minimizing the number of cat-
egories of being.  But the two positions rejected
are causal reductionism, “the view that the
behavior of the parts of a system...is determina-
tive of the behavior of all higher-level entities,”
and reductive materialism, which goes beyond
ontological reductionism to claim “that only the
entities at the lowest level are really real; higher-
level entities...are only composites of atoms.”
(Here, Murphy pictures the hierarchy of levels as
an extension of a sequence such as physics-chem-
istry-biology, an improved version of which I will
take to be Dooyeweerd’s modal aspects of creat-
ed reality.)11  Permit me to elaborate a little on
these three reductionisms and their respective
acceptance and rejection in “nonreductive physi-
calism.”
An important aspect of ontological reduction-
ism is the rejection of the ancient Greek dualism
of being still dominating western civilization
(including Christianity), which postulates that
humans are constituted by two types of sub-
stance: the physical body plus the spiritual soul.
While I don’t intend here to enter into a full dis-
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cussion of the nature of the soul, Genesis 2:7
(“And the LORD God formed man of the dust of
the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the
breath of life; and man became a living soul”
[KJV]) indicates that instead of having souls,
people are souls.  While I join the “nonreductive
physicalist” in this eschewing of two (or more)
types of substance, a Reformed, Christian
approach must contest the inherent reductionism
of claiming that the one kind of stuff out of which
the world is made is the stuff of physics.  Before
turning to this critique, let me round out this brief
explanation of Murphy’s definition of “nonreduc-
tive physicalism.”
It is clear that scientists such as Weinberg and
Atkins adhere strictly to causal reductionism,
which is clearly opposed to the Reformed, bibli-
cal teaching that persons cannot legitimately pass
all responsibility for their decisions and actions to
their constituent parts.  While not denying that
our members play an important role (consider,
e.g., “If your right eye causes you to sin...”
[Matthew 5:29]), we are created in the image of
God, in relationship with others, endowed with
conscience and will.  While ions and molecules
(etc.) are important in the physical and chemical
processes of living things, I join the “nonreduc-
tive physicalist” in recognizing that a cat’s
response to a mouse cannot be strictly due to the
physical interactions between the particles of the
cat, mouse, and environment.  In addition to the
argument from will adduced by Murphy, I deny
causal reductionism primarily because the biotic
and sensitive aspects12 of the cat are not reducible
to its physical aspects, even though these aspects
are related to (specifically, retrocipate on) the
physical.
Reductive materialism is the form of reduc-
tion perhaps simplest to refute both from com-
mon experience (we routinely refer to cats, col-
leges, and concepts as no less real than one anoth-
er)13 and from the philosophy of science (which
in recent years has largely grown to recognize as
valid the critical realism of the working scientist,
and especially so in Christian circles).14 The
reminder of the “nonreductive physicalist” to
resist the significant temptation to regard cats as
“more real” than concepts is important to bear in
mind.
Thus, while affirming “nonreductive physical-
ism” insofar as it rejects reductive materialism
and causal reductionism, let me explain in some
more detail why I cannot accept its notion of
ontological reductionism.  Essentially, the prob-
lem with “nonreductive physicalism” is that it is,
after all, a physicalist position: it reduces every-
thing to the physical; it elevates this one aspect of
created reality as being fundamental, basic,
uniquely essential, primary, foundational.  And it
claims that the universe is physical, in a certain
presumed-unambiguous sense: the warrant for
Christian faith to affirm the various things it
affirms, such as persons, communities, soul, is
supposed to be that these are, at bottom, physical
in a traditional, modernist sense.
The Limited Fundamentality of Physics
Now it must be conceded that there are certain
senses in which the physical is foundational and
essential.   Thus, it can be argued that the disci-
pline of physics is the most fundamental of the
so-called natural sciences and serves as a founda-
tion for other natural science disciplines (espe-
cially chemistry and biology).  Physics, as the sci-
ence about the physical aspect of creation (using
Dooyeweerd’s modal aspects), is a fundamental
science because all science by virtue of its being
empirical involves interaction with the created
world, and interaction is the kernel of the physi-
cal aspect.15 That is, we gain understanding about
the world by interacting with it,16 which requires
(but is not exhausted by) the receipt of sensory
signals, all of which involve physical interaction:
light focused by the eye’s lens interacts with elec-
trons in the retina; air-pressure waves entering the
ear canal are directed to vibrate the tympanic
membrane, etc.  Much of the instrumentation
used in the scientific disciplines can be seen as
enhancements to human senses by, in part, objec-
tive quantification (e.g., the measurement of
mass, which is an improvement of our subjective
ability, through the sense of touch [e.g., “heft-
ing”], to compare and estimate masses), increas-
ing resolution (e.g., the optical microscope and
telescope), extending ranges (e.g., measuring the
electromagnetic spectrum beyond the “visible,”
and sound waves beyond the “audible”), as well
as additional types of interactions (e.g., the meas-
urement of magnetic fields). In addition to the
importance of the physical aspect in gaining
knowledge in every field, the discipline of
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physics (specifically the atomic sub-discipline)
studies the interactions of the entities (atoms,
ions, electrons) that chemistry as a discipline
builds upon (molecules),17 which, in turn, biolo-
gy builds upon (e.g., organic molecules), which,
in turn, physiological psychology builds upon
(e.g., neurons).  By “building upon,” I mean not
only in terms of studying the aggregate entities
and their interactions but also in that the results
and conclusions of physics (and to a lesser degree
its methods) are employed and assumed in chem-
istry, etc.  However, it must be kept in mind that
there is no sense in which biology simply builds
upon chemistry or physics, for I agree with
Stafleu that from the point of view of
Dooyeweerd’s modal aspects, “the view that the
modal aspects form a sort of ‘layer’ structure in
reality, with each layer built upon the earlier ones,
is prohibited.”18 Therefore, this is not meant to
be an exhaustive definition of the disciplines of
physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology or of
their interrelationships, but simply examples of
the dependence of the latter on the former. In
addition, these disciplines need not build upon
only the one immediately more fundamental; for
example, physiological psychology will deal
directly with effects of the electrical impulses of
physics.
Furthermore, it is certainly true that everything
in creation, whether it be cats, colleges, or con-
cepts, cannot exist without the entities of physics
and their interactions.  This is perhaps most clear
with cats, as they have bodily organs, which have
organic tissues, which have organic molecules,
which have atoms.  Colleges, while not essential-
ly involving bricks and mortar, have people,
which have bodily organs, etc.  Concepts are con-
ceived in someone’s mind, which is intimately
related with her brain, or through complex inter-
personal dynamics, adding the aspect of a dynam-
ic physical interaction among people above the
connection to the physical entities; concepts may
be subsequently documented in books or comput-
er files or other storage media, all of which
involve chemicals (e.g., ink and paper) and/or
electromagnetism (e.g.,  magnetization patterns
on hard drives).  It must be noted, however, that
this dependence of everything upon physical enti-
ties is relative to God’s faithful sustaining of all
things, by which is meant more than God’s suste-
nance of the physical entities.  
Finally, the physical aspect can be considered
special in at least one other sense, namely that
everything in the universe at large, outside of the
earth and the limited human influence within and
beyond the solar system, appears to be qualified
by the physical aspect and no higher aspects.19
The next higher aspect on Dooyeweerd’s scale of
modal aspects is the biotic, and there is no evi-
dence that any living thing has ever existed apart
from those whose home is earth.20 Thus, life and
its influences occupy, spatially, an extremely
small fraction of the creation, demonstrating that
passages such as Isaiah 40:15 (“Surely the
nations are like a drop in a bucket; they are
regarded as dust on the scales; he weighs the
islands as though they were fine dust.”) and
Psalm 8:3, 4 (“When I consider your heavens, the
work of your fingers, the moon and the stars,
which you have set in place, what is man that you
are mindful of him, the son of man that you care
for him?”) are clearly not hyperbolic.  But per-
haps more than the specialness of the physical
aspect, these considerations point out the excep-
tional place of the earth in the cosmos.21
Thus, the discipline of physics is fundamental
to all empirical sciences: everything in creation
depends on physical entities, and most of the uni-
verse can be characterized as being physical
objects.  But none of these senses in which
physics is foundational or essential amount to an
argument that the physical aspect is the most fun-
damental aspect.  The three modal aspects upon
which the physical retrocipates, namely the
numerical, spatial, and kinematic, might lay equal
claim to fundamentality.  For these aspects point
out respectively the distinguishability and count-
ability of objects, the spatial extent of and separa-
tion between things, and the changes over time; it
is impossible for me to imagine a non-trivial uni-
verse in which any of these characteristics fail to
hold.  One could also argue that the pistic aspect
is the most fundamental, as it relates to values and
commitments, which shape and direct our rela-
tionships with all created things.
The “De-Materialization” of Physics in the
Twentieth Century
Let me now elucidate the physical reduction-
ism found in “nonreductive physicalism,” which,
as already stated above, postulates that “no new
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kinds of metaphysical ‘ingredients’ need to be
added to produce higher-level entities from
lower.”  The basic problem with this claim is that
it elevates the composition of entities as though
what things are made of is of ultimate concern to
a discussion of their ontology.  In other words, the
existence of a thing in creation hinges upon the
fact that it is composed of ingredients which are
the entities studied in physics.  The warrant for
“nonreductive physicalism” to affirm the reality
of higher-level entities, such as concepts, is
essentially and only that these higher-level enti-
ties have been “produced from” the lower-level
entities that are universally, at least among all
types of philosophical and/or scientific realists,
taken to be real.  An additional problem with this
claim, regarding the meaning of “production” of
higher-level entities from lower, will be discussed
later along with emergence.
Several difficulties with the elevation of com-
position are apparent from the discipline of
physics itself, specifically through the successive
developments of the special theory of relativity,
quantum mechanics, quantum field theory, and
string theory; these theories represent a progres-
sion of ideas about the fundamental nature of par-
ticles and make it increasingly difficult to retain a
notion of there being a substance from which all
else is constructed.
Special relativity, among other things, unveils
mass as being a form of energy, the equivalence
being seen in Einstein’s famous 1905 equation E
= mc2, which indicates how to find the energy E
of a mass m; here c is the speed of light.  Energy
can be turned into mass (i.e. “matter”), and vice
versa, the most familiar examples being nuclear
fission and fusion.  Thus, one cannot unproblem-
atically regard, for example, a carbon atom (say
12C) as being composed of six protons, six neu-
trons, and six electrons.  There is much more to
relate than simply the compositional story:  spe-
cial relativity indicates that energies of interac-
tion between these entities are integral to what
12C is.  Assembling the “parts” to produce 12C is
not simple; in addition to the detailed sequences
of steps that must be followed (and are, in the
core of a star), energy must at first be put in, and
a little more energy is later given off, and the
mass of the product is a little less than the mass of
the reactants from which we started.  In fact, the
same thing happens in any chemical reaction that
gives off heat energy: a little bit of mass turns into
that energy.22
The point here is that special relativity begins
to show us that the question of composition is not
simply one of the identification of constituent
entities, and that what one regards as being
“stuff” or “ingredients” must be at least put
alongside of energy, which is not easy to regard as
material.
Quantum mechanics, touched upon by
Einstein in his 1905 paper on the photoelectric
effect and then developed (primarily by others) in
the 1920s, showed that regarding subatomic enti-
ties as particles is complementary to regarding
them as probability waves.  At first, light, which
Newton believed to be composed of “corpuscles”
and which was later shown (in 1803) by Thomas
Young to be a wave in an unambiguous interfer-
ence demonstration, was shown to possess both
wave aspects (e.g. frequency, wavelength) and
particle aspects (e.g. momentum, countability).
Louis de Broglie extended this idea to all entities
that are normally considered particles, and now,
confirming this, large molecules, such as the
famous buckyballs (C60), have been seen to
undergo wave interference.  Certain types of
questions are actually incoherent, such as asking
which hole something passed through on the way
to a screen showing an interference pattern.  The
interaction between an entity and its observer is
such that its wave nature manifests itself when
wave-like questions are asked, and its particle
nature manifests itself when particle-like ques-
tions are asked.  However, the more one knows
about the wave nature of a specific entity, the less
one knows about its particle nature, and vice
versa; hence, the “complementarity” of the wave-
particle duality.  The recognition of the reality of
the wave nature of entities is a blow to the idea of
composition being fundamental, for we now have
the problematic situation of probability waves
becoming building blocks!
A further step is taken in quantum field theo-
ry, well established since its first implementation
as quantum electrodynamics in 1950, which
shows that particles are quantizations of
omnipresent fields.  Interactions between parti-
cles are mediated by virtual particles that are con-
stantly being created and annihilated in all possi-
ble ways; in fact, it is impossible to separate inter-
actions between particles from the particles them-
selves.23 The quantum fields are certainly less
“substantial,” but no less real, than the particles
touted as being the building blocks of matter.
Furthermore, the notion of “constituent particles”
cannot be carried down to the quantum world
unproblematically, given that the entities of
which nucleons are said to be constituted, name-
ly quarks, can neither exist independently nor be
dissociated from one another,24 and that not sim-
ply in the practical sense but even in principle.
Finally, string theory, slowly developing over
the last three decades and not yet firmly estab-
lished, states that what we regard as the funda-
mental particles are in fact special modes of oscil-
lation of yet more fundamental “strings.”25 If one
listens to the pure musical tones we call C  and G
without any knowledge of sources of musical
sound, one might suppose that these are two dif-
ferent, albeit related, creatures.  However, know-
ing that a given tone is generated by the lowest-
frequency resonance of a vibrating clamped piano
string of a certain length, mass, and tension
allows a deeper connection to be established
between these otherwise mysteriously related
tones.  Quite similarly, string theory claims that
the entities we know as the electron and the top
quark might in fact “simply” be different resonant
modes of a more universal and fundamental enti-
ty called a string, or superstring.  As a piano-
string resonant mode has a characteristic frequen-
cy (or pitch) that determines how it will interact
with others harmonically or melodically, a reso-
nant mode of a superstring has a particular mass,
charge, spin, baryon number, lepton number, etc.,
which dictate how it will interact physically with
others.  Furthermore, it is supposed that the
superstring extends into multiple higher dimen-
sions beyond our familiar three.  And there is no
guarantee that this is simply the first step of a
series ending in a truly fundamental type of enti-
ty rather than an infinite regress.26, 27 It is clear,
then, that a superstring is of a different metaphys-
ical nature than the fundamental particles of
physics, calling into question the coherence of the
notion of a “metaphysical ingredient” employed
by the “nonreductive physicalist” position.
Thus, the twentieth century, which began
with what could be regarded as an empirical
demonstration of the materialistic atomistic
vision of Democritus, saw a progressive “de-
materialization” of physics through the succes-
sion of special relativity, quantum mechanics,
quantum field theory, and string theory.  Modern
physics, then, has something quite different in
view regarding the structure of the universe than
the ordinary parlance used by the “nonreductive
physicalist.”
Instead of maintaining that a certain catego-
ry of metaphysical substance is foundational,
Christianity claims the will of God as the founda-
tion of all that exists, not simply in the sense that
he creates the matter from which all else is built,
but that he creates and sustains the entire creation
as an integral whole with its multifaceted charac-
ter. It is only one feature of the creation that cer-
tain things exhibit the characteristic of having
constituent entities (be they planks, rocks, cells,
particles, waves, fields, or strings) that interact
with one another.28 That is, the physical is only
one aspect among many that are exhibited by any
given thing.  Thus, there is no need to argue that
the mind is not made of a new metaphysical
ingredient different from the brain, and that the
physical structure of the brain gives rise to men-
tal properties. Instead, we have here a holistic
approach: the human brain and the human mind
each have the full range of aspects.29 The human
brain, qualified by the biotic aspect, has a certain
number of neurons and size, changes over time,
and features multitudes of physical interactions
between electrons and nuclei, including various
biotic processes such as regeneration of damage.
Apparently, the human brain (together with the
rest of the central nervous system) provides a
central capacity of sensation.  The human mind,
qualified by the next higher aspect, the analytical,
is the seat of discernment.  Due to its intimate
connection with the brain, it shares the brain’s
sensitive and lower aspects, and both the brain
and the mind are objects to the remaining aspects,
as they enable humans (and society, for example)
to be involved in culture formation, to communi-
cate through language, to interact socially, to dis-
cern resource usage, to be creative, and to be just,
generous, and  committed.
In fact, plenty of things in creation are sim-
ply not made (or composed) of anything at all.
There is no sense in which one could argue that a
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“concept,” which certainly exists as a real entity
in creation, has constituent components ultimate-
ly composed of atoms.  However, a concept does
have a physical aspect.  If the concept is held in
one’s mind, it coheres with certain neuron inter-
action patterns in the brain; if written down, it is
preserved through binding between molecules of
ink and paper; if it exists in a brainstorming ses-
sion in a discussion group, it is manifested by the
physically-mediated interactions among the par-
ticipants.  Thus, it is necessary to replace the
Aristotelian idea of physical composition with
that of physical aspect and recognize its place
among the other aspects of creation.  Similarly, it
becomes clear that this is not a “physical uni-
verse” but a universe which, along with every-
thing in it, has a physical aspect.
Several benefits attend this downfall of
“nonreductive physicalism” (This “nonreductive
physicalism” was accomplished by recognizing
the physical as being just one aspect among
many).  One of these benefits is the acknowledg-
ment of the legitimate ontology of things in cre-
ation characterized, or qualified, by the various
modal aspects.  In addition, this recognition will
help reduce the tendency in some fields, especial-
ly biology and neuro-psychology, to pass certain
questions or issues down to physics.  That is to
say, in some areas of research where a biologist
gets stuck in terms of determining certain causal
explanations or structural relationships, he or she
might be inclined to relegate the responsibility —
often too easily accepted by physicists eager to
demonstrate their supposed omnicompetence —
of a more ultimate explanation “down” to the dis-
cipline of physics.  Also, while much of current
philosophy of science is based on the philosophy
of physics because physics is presumed to be the
most basic and foundational, even model, sci-
ence,30 recognizing the physical as one aspect
among others will help develop a more fully
orbed philosophy of science, recognizing the
importance of the different methodologies of
inquiry that rightfully play roles in the other sci-
entific disciplines, rather than focusing on what
some regard as the highly problematic ontology
of the entities of mechanics due to their lying so
far beyond imagination.  Finally, this approach
recognizes the limitedness of physics as a disci-
pline and the intrinsic value of the other fields of
study.  There is one set of laws for, and regulari-
ties that apply to, the physical aspect of creation,
of which by our scientific approach we can devel-
op verisimilitudinous formulations, but the other
aspects also have their own organizing principles.
The laws of biology (such as in genetics and ecol-
ogy) are not identical to, nor can they be derived
from, nor even in principle be based upon, the
laws of physics.
Emergence
Having surveyed and critiqued non-reductive
physicalism, I must now address the closely relat-
ed topic of emergence, which has already been
alluded to at several points above.  Emergence is
the idea that higher-level entities are produced
from lower-level entities.  The archetypical
example of emergence is that of the mind emerg-
ing from the brain, meaning that the physical
structure of the brain produces the consciousness
and thinking capacity that we associate with the
mind.  Emergence is a hallmark of so-called com-
plex systems, which are those exhibiting behav-
iours or properties completely new and unexpect-
ed on the basis only of the component parts of
which the system has been composed and their
relations; thus, the essential features of complex
systems cannot be comprehended upon piecemeal
analysis.  Somehow, the assemblage of the inter-
acting bits and pieces possesses qualitatively new
and surprising phenomena, which led a theoreti-
cal condensed-matter physicist to choose as the
title of a seminal paper “More is Different.”31 In
considering a theory of brain-to-mind emergence,
philosophers of science point to examples of what
is called self-organization and spontaneous pat-
tern formation such as that of Stuart Kauffman,32
who describes an array of light bulbs, each of
which in a subsequent iteration are on or off
depending, according to any non-trivial rule, on
the status of two other bulbs.  In a 10,000-bulb
array, out of the 210,000 possible patterns (this
number is close to 1 followed by 3,000 zeros,
which by far exceeds the number of elementary
particles in the observed universe), the array very
quickly settles into repeating a sequence of —
very surprisingly — only about one hundred pat-
terns. 33 Two simple examples of self-organiza-
tion from common experience are the sponta-
neous formation of sand ripples and of weather
systems.  A somewhat more unfamiliar but
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instructive example is that of Rayleigh-Bénard
convection found in a fluid between two horizon-
tal plates.  When the bottom plate’s temperature is
raised above that of the top plate by a certain min-
imum amount that depends on other properties of
the liquid such as its viscosity, the motion of the
fluid’s molecules undergoes a transition from
being random (Brownian motion) to a dynamic
pattern of convection cells (see Figures 1 and 2).  
Figure 1.  Rayleigh-Bénard convection cells,
viewed from the side (schematic).
Figure 2.  Rayleigh-Bénard convection cells in
pressurized carbon dioxide, imaged from above.
White and black indicate opposite upward and
downward flow respectively.  Reprinted with per-
mission from S.W. Morris et al., “Spiral Defect
Chaos in Large Aspect Ratio Rayleigh-Bénard
Convection, Physical Review Letters 71 (1993):
2026-9.  Copyright 1993 by the American
Physical Society.
Here the motion of individual particles in the
fluid is due much less to their microphysical
interactions than to the spontaneously established
macroscopic patterns.  
Other examples of emergence often cited are
bulk material properties that are claimed to be
quite unconnected to, or at least unpredictable a
priori from, atomic properties, such as the wet-
ness of water, the hardness of diamond, and
superconductivity.  These are all demonstrated
examples of emergence, which lead philosophers
of science, such as Philip Clayton,34 to speculate
that life emerges from organic materials and mind
emerges from brain.  Hisakazu Inagaki discusses
the emergence of human social structures in Karl
Popper’s “World 3.”35 In fact, Harold Morowitz
in his recent book, The Emergence of Everything,
claims to “present a catalog of 28 observed
instances that have emergence in common,”36
ranging sequentially, and somewhat simplistical-
ly, from the big bang to spirituality.
Using Dooyeweerd’s modal analysis, we per-
ceive a crucial difference between two different
types of emergence, namely that while many
examples putatively involve emergence from a
system qualified by one aspect to an entity quali-
fied by a higher aspect, emergences that have
actually been observed,37 with possible excep-
tions in infant development, always begin and
end with entities qualified by the same (or even
lower!) modal aspect.  The speculation that a col-
lection of physical objects emerge into a biotic
entity does not follow from having seen emer-
gence occur in collections of physical objects, in
which the emerging entity remains a physical
entity.  That is, it does not follow that life natural-
ly develops from non-living matter, that the brain
produces a mind, or that religion will emerge
within a society.  It is this production of a higher-
level entity from lower-level entities that is cen-
tral to “nonreductive physicalism.”
Now, physical entities can in fact be com-
bined together to produce items that exhibit a
higher aspect, such as the aesthetic.  Clearly,
when an artist fabricates a painting from various
media, this fabrication requires human agency
and is therefore not an example of emergence
which is supposed to be by self-organization.  But
what about a beautiful pattern of ice crystals
spontaneously forming on glass, with its undeni-
ably aesthetic quality?  One might argue that this
is again not self-organization since the artist here
is God.  While it is certainly appropriate to recog-
nize the hand of God here, it should be empha-
sized that there is a vast chasm of distinction
between the ways in which the artist and God sep-
arately work with physical entities.  In the case of
the frost pattern, God through his Word and Spirit
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is at work:  he has established, faithfully sustains,
and enables the outworking and bringing to
fruition of the lawful structures and interactions
of water, glass, and air.  Granting that this ground-
ing in God’s work must in fact be recognized as
foundational to anything that one might called
self-organization, we would categorize the frost
pattern but not the painting as self-organization.
But most importantly in the context of my argu-
ment here, this is still an example of self-organi-
zation, which both begins and ends with entities
that are qualified by the physical aspect, for the
frost pattern is an object to the aesthetic aspect,
not subject to it;38 clearly it is not alive in any
sense (and therefore not even biotically-quali-
fied), even though it demonstrates many of life’s
qualities such as growth, reproduction, response
to stimuli, utilization of energy, etc. (which is a
reminder of the value of intuitive recognition of
life vis-à-vis defining life39).  In fact, upon reflec-
tion, one can see that pattern-formation found in
sand ripples and Rayleigh-Bénard convection
cells fits into the same category as the frost pat-
tern: physically-qualified, but having a clear aes-
thetic aspect.  Thus, neither the painting nor the
frost pattern is a counter-example to my observa-
tion that emergence has not been observed to
result in bona fide higher-level entities.
One might also raise the following as a
counter-example to my claim that the only obser-
vations of emergence are those which occur with-
in a single modal aspect: grouping people togeth-
er results in social group dynamics.  This certain-
ly is an example of emergence, as can be seen by
the fact that new phenomena are found in a group,
phenomena that would not have been predictable
based on any study of humans which considered
them only as individuals.  In this case, however,
both the persons and the group of persons are
qualified by the full range of Dooyeweerdian
aspects, so while new properties emerge, their
emergence does not bring us to a higher modal
aspect.
In the above examples of emergence, the
general phenomenon occurring is that novel prop-
erties are seen in a complex system that would not
have been expected given the properties of the
entities of which the system is composed.  For
example, water, to the extent that one could
describe it as a collection of water (H2O) mole-
cules, has the property of wetness (roughly defin-
able as a liquid’s tendency to cling to surfaces in
droplets or sheets, depending on the surface) even
though there is nothing about a single water mol-
ecule that would lead one to that prediction; in
fact, quite a significant collection of water mole-
cules in close proximity is required before the
property begins to become manifest.  Now, this is
not to deny that there is certainly something about
the molecules of water (or many other liquids for
that matter) to which one can point in an explana-
tion of the wetness, especially in the nature of
their weak long-range hydrogen bonds when in
the liquid form.  But this is a relationship between
water molecules whose description required care-
ful studies of liquid water in the first place.  That
is, wetness is explained a posteriori, not a pri-
ori.40 The same appears to be true for all of the
examples of physical emergence mentioned
above, so that one can indeed meaningfully use
novelty and unexpectedness of properties as a
characterization of emergence as a class of phe-
nomena.41
How is it, then, that we find in creation enti-
ties that are qualified by the higher modal
aspects?  It is not that these things are built from,
much less produced by, lower-level entities, for
this possibility attributes too much autonomy to
things in creation, which should be spoken of
more passively.  God has created the cosmos in
such a way that each thing exhibits (when sub-
jected to human investigation) the full range of
modal aspects, and he sustains it by his Word of
power, and he empowers it by his Spirit to devel-
op, flourish, and unfold.  Psalm 104:30 reads,
“When you send your Spirit, they are created, and
you renew the face of the earth.”  Citing this
verse, Pannenberg writes, “the Spirit of God is the
life-giving principle, to which all creatures owe
life, movement, and activity.  This is particularly
true of animals, plants, and humans.”  A little fur-
ther, he writes, “The Spirit of God is the creative
principle of movement as well as life”42 Also, in
the Nicene Creed, Christians confess that “we
believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord, the giver of
life.”  While all of these claims relate to life, I
find it helpful to consider that one aspect of the
work of God in the providence and government
of the universe is that the Holy Spirit is active in
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a special way in bringing about any inter-modal
emergence that occurs.  In fact, a fully Trinitarian
approach to emergence is possible, as can be seen
especially by considering passages such as
Genesis 1:11, “Let the land produce vegetation,”
in which the Word of God goes forth from God
the Father and, with eyes informed by Psalm
104:30, we see that it is the Spirit of God who is
at work in a way to enable the land to produce
vegetation, and who is at work in the appearance
of frost patterns, and also who is at work in the
development of consciousness in a human child.
This is, of course, just one of the many ways
in which God interacts with the cosmos he has
created by his fiat.  God is continually known by
the “preservation and government of the uni-
verse” (Belgic Confession, Article 2), “sustaining
all things by his powerful word” (Hebrews 1:3),
being faithful to the patterns and regularities he
has established in his covenant with creation so
that “as long as the earth endures, seedtime and
harvest, cold and heat, summer and winter, day
and night will never cease” (Genesis 8:22).  God
acted, and continues to act, in the sweep of
redemptive history through covenants with and
salvation for his creation and his people.  The pin-
nacle of God’s interaction with the cosmos is the
incarnation of the second person of the trinity, in
which he took upon himself our flesh and blood,
our molecules and social structures.  And he
answers the prayers of those who call to him in
faith in the name of Jesus.
Notes
1. I would like to thank Roger Henderson,
Charles Adams, and John Zwart for helpful
comments on a draft of this paper; Hisakazu
Inagaki for many valuable conversations; and
the John Templeton Foundation, the Council
for Christian Colleges and Universities, and
Wycliffe Hall (Oxford University) for the
opportunity to study these topics in the John
Templeton Oxford Seminars on Science and
Christianity (2003-05).
2. The World Year of Physics, 2005, commemo-
rates Einstein’s 1905 estab-
lishment of a new epoch in
physics by explaining the
photoelectric effect and for-
mulating the special theory of
relativity in addition to accounting for
Brownian motion.  This paper is published, in
part, in celebration of this milestone.
3. This is discussed in a little more detail in 
Arnold Sikkema, “Science: A Cultural
Activity,” Reformed Perspective 20.3
(January 2001): 289.  Of particular interest is
that this obedience to the cultural mandate is
often done unwittingly by unbelievers.
4. Donald M. MacKay, The Clock Work Image
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1974), 21.
5. Steven Weinberg, “Reductionism Redux,”
New York Review of Books 42.15 (5 October
1995): 39-42.  Vladimir Katasonov has point-
ed out to me that Nobel-prize-winning physi-
cist Vitaly Ginzburg is similarly active in the
Russian context.
6. P.W. Atkins, “The Limitless Power of
Science,” Ch. 8 in Nature’s Imagination: The
Frontiers of Scientific Vision, ed. John
Cornwell (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1995), 130.
7. Ibid., 131.  
8. Warren S. Brown, Nancey Murphy, & H.
Newton Malony, eds.  Whatever Happened to
the Soul? Scientific and Theological
Portraits of Human Nature (Minneapolis:
Fortress Press, 1998); nonreductive physical-
ism has its origins in the 1916 work of Roy
Wood Sellars, as shown in Nancey Murphy,
“Supervenience and the Nonreducibility of
Ethics in Biology,” in R.J. Russell et al., eds.,
Evolutionary and Molecular Biology:
Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action
(Vatican City State/Berkeley, CA: Vatican
Observatory/Center for Theology and the
Natural Sciences, l998), 463-89. 
9. Nancey Murphy, “Human Nature: Historical,
Scientific, and Religious Issues,” Ch. 1 in
Whatever Happened to the Soul? (2).
10. Nancey Murphy, “Nonreductive Physicalism:
Philosophical Issues,” Ch. 6 in Whatever
Happened to the Soul? (129f.).
11. Indeed, such hierarchies are found in many
writings on critical realism [as reviewed in
Alister E. McGrath, A Scientific Theology,
Vol. II: Reality (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
2002), 219-26]; they all lack the generality,
comprehensiveness, definitiveness, and inter-
relatedness of Dooyeweerd’s.  The relation
Pro Rege—June 2005  29
between Dooyeweerd’s aspect hierarchy and
the complexity hierarchy of Nancey Murphy
& George F.R. Ellis, On the Moral Nature of
the Universe (Minneapolis: Fortress Press,
1996) is a topic for future investigation; for
example, it appears that increasing structural
complexity is merely a by-product, rather
than an essential feature, of proceeding
through the hierarchy of modal aspects.
12. I refer here to the modal aspects of
Dooyeweerd’s philosophy of the cosmonom-
ic idea, which need no further explication
here due to their familiarity to the Dordt
College community.  The relevance of the
concepts of aspectual anticipation (roughly
meaning provision), retrocipation (roughly
meaning dependence), and enkapsis (the frac-
tal-like structure of the modal aspects) to
emergence is a topic for further study.
13. One way of solidifying this is by defining real
as G.F.R. Ellis does: anything that can causal-
ly affect other real things, as reported by Karl
Giberson, “Princeton Conference Pushes
Boundaries,” Research News Online (May
2002) www.stnews.org/archives/2002/May_
features.html (now called Science and
Theology News).
14. Critical realism explains the growing
verisimilitude with which theories represent
entities as being due to the interplay between
ontology (what is) and epistemology (what
we know).  For a defense of critical realism
from a scientific and Christian point of view,
not further explored in this paper, see espe-
cially John C. Polkinghorne, “What was hap-
pening?” Ch. 21 (158-176) of Rochester
Roundabout: The Story of High Energy
Physics (New York: W.H. Freeman & Co.,
1989), John C. Polkinghorne, “Critical
Realism in Science and Religion,” Ch. 5
(101-24) of Belief in God in an Age of
Science (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1998), and Alister E. McGrath, A Scientific
Theology, Vol. II: Reality (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 2002). 
15. This becomes most clear in M.D. Stafleu,
Time and Again (Toronto: Wedge, 1980).
Stafleu writes, in a section on the measure-
ment problem in quantum mechanics, “we
characterize physical systems by their inter-
action as the basic physical subject-subject
relation” (193).  My 1998 too-late-for-publi-
cation review of this valuable book is at
homepages.dordt.edu/~sikkema/StafleuTime
AndAgain.pdf.  While some use force and/or
energy to characterize the physical aspect,
these concepts lose their meaning and rele-
vance at the quantum level, while interaction
does not.  That other aspects (e.g. social) also
feature interaction is an example of the inter-
relatedness of the modal aspects (e.g. social
interaction requires physical interaction). 
16. That is not to say that this interaction will be
objective or unidirectional, for we are part of
the world.  In physics this becomes especial-
ly important when considering the realm of
quantum mechanics, as becomes clear in the
measurement problem. 
17. A much more nuanced comparison of physics
and chemistry, based on a historical analysis,
is given in Mary Jo Nye, “Physics and
Chemistry: Commensurate or Incommensu-
rate Sciences,” in Mary Jo Nye et al. (eds.),
The Invention of Physical Science:
Intersections of mathematics theology and
natural philosophy since the seventeenth cen-
tury (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1992),
205-24.  Of particular interest is her conclu-
sion that “the reductionist program appears
not to have been achieved by the founders of
quantum chemistry.”
18. Stafleu, 17; this is an element of my critique
of McGrath’s “stratification” of reality. 
19. The qualifying aspect of a thing is also called
its leading aspect, as discussed in Stafleu,
17f.
20. That Christian theology does not rule out
extra-terrestrial life, or even extra-terrestrial
intelligence, is well argued in C.S. Lewis,
Miracles (New York:  Macmillan, 1947), 59-
65.
21. The physical features of the universe neces-
sary for life on earth are thoroughly reviewed
in Peter D. Ward & Donald Brown, Rare
Earth:  Why Complex Life is Uncommon in
the Universe (New York: Copernicus Books,
2004).  Going beyond this the characteristics
of earth required for us to develop and satis-
fy curiosity about the wider cosmos are dis-
cussed in Guillermo Gonzalez & Jay Wesley
30 Pro Rege—June 2005
Richards, The Privileged Planet:  How Our
Place in the Cosmos Is Designed for
Discovery  (Wash ing ton :   Regnery
Publishing, 2004).   
22. Note, then, that the elementary-school con-
cept of “conservation of mass” is only
approximately true. 
23. Arnold E. Sikkema, “Death of the Watch-
maker:  Modern Science and the Providence
of God,” Ch. 5 (97-108) of Hans Boersma,
ed., Living in the LambLight:  Christianity
and Contemporary Challenges to the Gospel
(Vancouver:  Regent College Publishing,
2001). 
24. Ernan McMullin, “A Case for Scientific
Realism,” Ch. 2 (8-40) of Jarrett Leplin, ed.,
Scientific Realism (Berkeley:  University of
California Press, 1984). 
25. A similar point is made in G.F.R. Ellis,
“Quantum Theory and the Macroscopic
World” in R. Russell et al., eds., Quantum
Mechanics:  Scientific Perspectives on
Divine Action (Vatican City State/Berkeley,
CA:  Vatican Observatory/Center for
Theology and the Natural Sciences, 2001),
259-291):  “[if] the higher levels of order are
in some sense not real…whereas the lowest
levels are indeed real [,then given] that we
don’t even know what the lowest levels of
structure are…we don’t know what is really
real!” (276). 
26. Christianity does not resolve this particular
dilemma of the “nonreductive physicalist”
encountering string theory, as an infinite
regress is not outside of the realm of possibil-
ities of an omnipotent creator.  Similarly, a
universe extending into the infinite past has
no less need for or dependency upon a cre-
ator, as discussed in William E. Carroll,
“Aquinas and the Big Bang,” First Things 97
(Nov. 1999): 18-20. 
27. A related point is made in Philip Clayton,
Mind & Emergence:  From Quantum to Con-
sciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004); in Ch. 1, he argues for “monism”
rather than “physicalism,” writing that “[w]e
should not assume that the entities postulated
by physics complete the inventory of what
exists” while insisting that “[r]eality is ulti-
mately composed of one basic kind of stuff.” 
28. Andrew Basden, www.isi.salford.ac.uk/dooy/
existence.html (1999), summarizes the solu-
tion to this problem as being a shift from the
western (Greek) focus on entities and exis-
tence to a more biblical focus on meaning,
quoting Dooyeweerd’s famously italicized
dictum, “Meaning is the being of all that has
been created,” consistent with but having a
different purpose than my approach here.
Thus Dooyeweerd is closer to Wittgenstein,
with his over-emphasis on language, than to
Aristotle. 
29. In what follows, I briefly express a token item
for each of Dooyeweerd’s modal aspects,
namely the numerical, spatial, kinematic,
physical, biotic, sensitive analytical, forma-
tive, lingual, social, economic, aesthetic,
juridical, ethical, and pistic. 
30. This observation is due to Ernan McMullin,
“The role of epistemic values in science,”
lecture at Wycliffe Hall, Oxford, 2 August
2004. 
31. P.W. Anderson, “More is Different:  Broken
symmetry and the nature of the hierarchical
structure of science,” Science 177. 4047
(1972): 393-396.  See Robert B. Laughlin, A
Different Universe:  Reinventing Physics
from the Bottom Down (New York:  Basic
Books, 2005) for a recent non-technical elab-
oration. 
32. Stuart Kauffman, At Home in the Universe
(Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1994),
Ch. 4:  “[A]stonishingly simple rules…suf-
fice to ensure that unexpected and profound
dynamical order emerges spontaneously”
(74). 
33.  The relevance of this as a model of a real net-
work is dubious because it depends crucially
on having precisely two connections per
bulb; L.A.N. Amaral et al. [“Virtual Round
Table on ten leading questions for network
research,” European Physics Journal B. 38
(2004), 143-145] note that “the number of
elements with k links follows a power-law
distribution” indicating widely varying con-
nectivities.  (I thank Jeff Tseng for identifying
this reference.)
34. Clayton, Mind and Emergence.
35. Hisakazu Inagaki, “Personhood and Freedom
in Religio-Scientific Realism,” Pro Rege 32.3
Pro Rege—June 2005  31
(March 2004): 25-38. 
36. Harold J. Morowitz, The Emergence of
Everything (Oxford:  Oxford University
Press, 2002), 25; like most emergentists,
Morowitz links emergence with evolution.  (I
do not address the physical evolution of the
cosmos in this paper, and leave discussions of
biological evolution to others.) However, I
believe that emergence can be cast in a more
ontological, rather than temporal/develop-
mental, framework.  A similar insight can be
found in George F.R. Ellis, “On the Nature of
Emergent Reality,” in the forthcoming P.
Clayton & P.C.W. Davies, eds., The Re-emer-
gence of Emergence (Oxford University
Press, 2005):  “The existence of higher level
complex behaviour, which does not occur at
the lower levels, then emerges from the lower
level properties both structurally and func-
tionally (at each moment) and in evolutionary
and developmental terms (over time).” 
37. While philosopher of biology Philip Clayton
(private communication, July 2004) claims
that my notion of observation is narrow and
typical of physicists, and that biologists rou-
tinely speak of evolution, and even the origin
of life, as being observed, I maintain that
such claims of observation tend to conflate
theory, observation, and fact in ways that no
robust philosophy of science can support. 
38. The painting here is similar to the well-
known example of the bird-nest, which
though it performs a biotic function in pro-
viding habitat remains a physically-qualified
subject.  See Stafleu, p. 19, where subjects
and objects are distinguished:  “a stone can-
not be a biotic subject. Only organisms can
be subjects to biotic laws.  But atoms and
molecules, rocks and sticks, may function as
biotic objects within the sphere of some biot-
ic law.  For example, a bird’s nest, as a sub-
ject, is subjected to only mathematical and
physical laws.…As a bird’s nest, however, it
can be understood adequately only as a biot-
ic ‘object’.” 
39. On defining life, two valuable resources are
Aaldert Mennega, “What is Life?” unpub-
lished manuscript (Dordt College, 1971) and
Arthur Jones, ed., Science in Faith (UK:
Christian Schools Trust, 1998), 40f. 
40. This a posteriori aspect of emergence studies
is discussed as “art keyed to experiment” in
R.B. Laughlin & David Pines, “The Theory
of Everything,” Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of
America 97 (2000): 28-31.
41. An open question in this area is to what
degree emergence is related to downward,
entropy-reducing, phase transitions in gener-
al.  The incidences of pattern formation I
have discussed all involve an intuitive recog-
nition, a posteriori, of an organization of the
system at a certain point, and such patterns
can be characterized by order parameters
whose abrupt changes occur at the same place
in parameter space as the intuitively recog-
nized transition.  Other similarities with gen-
eral phase transitions are the importance of
interactions at all length scales and the con-
comitant relative independence of the result-
ing phenomenon upon microphysical proper-
ties and relations.  This is an area to which I
plan to devote more study.  
42. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology,
trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1994), Vol. 2, Ch. 7 in the section
entitled “The Spirit of God and the dynamic
of natural occurrence.” (I thank LeRon Shults
for pointing out this reference.) Pannenberg
also cites Genesis 2:7, Job 12:10, 33:4,
34:14f., and Psalm 104:29, to which I would
add Isaiah 32:15, “till the Spirit is poured
upon us from on high, and the desert becomes
a fertile field, and the fertile field seems like
a forest.” 
32 Pro Rege—June 2005
